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Abstract
Diﬀerential tax analysis is used to show how the optimal mix of inﬂation tax
and direct taxation changes with the relative size of the hidden economy. The
larger the relative size of the hidden economy, the smaller the optimal ratio of
direct tax to inﬂation tax. Anecdotal empirical evidence supports this result.
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2
1 Introduction.
Raising tax revenue when the hidden economy forms a large proportion of the total
economy is a pressing problem in many countries. Inﬂation tax (seignorage) is seen as
one solution, however, this leads to price inﬂation if the growth of the money supply
exceeds the growth of the total economy. This raises the question: How does the
relative size of the hidden economy aﬀect the optimal inﬂation tax?
The analysis is in the context of the optimal inﬂation tax model proposed by Phelps
(1973). Phelps’s model is modiﬁed to include a hidden economy as well as the visible
economy. Agents in the hidden economy are able to avoid direct taxation1 but unable
to avoid the inﬂation tax because they require cash to carry out transactions. The
paper proceeds as follows. In this section the motivation for the paper is continued. In
section 2 the model is presented and in section 3 it is solved. In section 4 the results
are discussed along with some anecdotal empirical evidence and possible extensions.
A ﬁnal section concludes.
1.1 What is the Hidden Economy?
The hidden, black, informal, parallel, second, shadow or underground economy repre-
sents all economic activity which is not subject to direct taxation. In countries with
developed tax-gathering authorities the hidden economy is typically associated with
criminal activity. In developing countries, with less developed tax-gathering authori-
ties, the hidden economy is typically made up of a large agricultural economy which is
not subject to direct taxation because the costs of levying taxes outweigh the potential
revenues. In such a context the hidden economy need not be illegal.
1.2 Inﬂation Tax and Seignorage.
Seignorage is the diﬀerence between the face value of money and the cost of manu-
facturing it. Because of diﬀerent manufacturing costs, the seignorage value of coins is
quite low, the seignorage value of paper money is considerably higher and the seignor-
age value of the monetary base created through money on call nearly equals the full
value of the monetary base increase. In this paper, the simplifying assumption is made
that the seignorage value is exactly equal to the full value of the new money supply.
Subject to conditions (i) to (v) outlined in section 2, the “revenue from the inﬂation
tax is simply its contribution to the government’s seignorage ... a tax on liquidity”.2
Seignorage can be a useful source of government revenue and all governments use
it to some extent. Fisher (1982) estimated the magnitude of seignorage for several
industrialised countries and found that this accounted for 6.1% of government revenue
during 1960-73 and 5.9% during 1973-78. The problem with raising large amounts of
revenue through seignorage is that it expands the monetary base, potentially leading to
high price inﬂation. For example, Fisher (1982) found that during 1960-73 Italy raised
9.8% of government revenue by seignorage and experienced 4.66% average inﬂation,
during 1973-79 seignorage rose to 16% and average inﬂation rose to 16.38%.
1In this context direct taxation includes income and/or expenditure taxes.
2Phelps (1973), page 75.
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2 The Inﬂation Tax: Concept and Measure.
As in Phelps (1973), assume an economy where the government raises revenue by an
inﬂation tax and by a direct tax. In contrast to Phelps (1973), the private sector
includes a hidden economy that is not subject to the direct tax. The private sector is
made up of the visible and hidden economies in the proportions 1−α and α respectively.
The relative size of the hidden economy has implications for the government’s choice
of the optimal tax-mix between the inﬂation and direct tax.
The simplifying assumptions underlying this analysis are that (i) agents forecast
inﬂation perfectly, (ii) the natural rate of output is not aﬀected by the level of inﬂation,
(iii) the economy is closed so that inﬂation is irrelevant as a stabilisation policy, (iv)
there are no costs to adjusting wage and prices, and (v) no interest is paid on money
balances.
2.1 The Government Sector.
The problem facing the government is one of having to maximise social welfare by
co-ordinating the actions of its three administrative branches; the expenditure branch,
the treasury and the central bank. The total tax yield is constant and diﬀerential
tax analysis is used to allocate taxes between inﬂation and direct taxation in order to
maximise utility in the private sector. The notation and equation numbering follows
closely that of Phelps (1973) so as to facilitate any comparisons.
The expenditure branch determines government expenditure (G) and beneﬁts (B)
as a function of time and independently of any other factors.
G = γ(t) ≥ 0, B = β(t) ≥ 0 (1)
The treasury, in ﬁnancing these expenditures, faces the budget constraint of match-
ing all costs and all revenues, including payments on the existing debt,
T +
D˙
p
= G+B + iD
D∗
p
(2)
where T is direct taxation on the visible economy, D is the accumulated debt which
includes both the public debt (D∗) and money (M), D∗ is the part of the accumulated
debt held by the private sector, p is the price level and iD is the nominal interest rate
on the debt.
The central bank sets the time path of the money supply (M) independently of the
treasury,
M = D −D∗ (3)
The money supply aﬀects the price level, therefore, the central bank is able to determine
alternative price level programs in the form,
p(t) = φ(t;π) (4)
where π is the target level of inﬂation for the central bank.
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2.2 The Private Sector.
The behaviour of the private sector is determined by the following consumption de-
mand (C) and manhour supply (H) functions. Total consumption is determined by
consumption in the hidden economy (Ch) and consumption in the visible economy (Cv).
Total hours are determined by hours in the hidden economy (Hh) and hours in the
visible economy (Hv). The parameter α determines the proportion of the population
N that is in each sector, so
C = Cv(Y˜ v,W ; ...; (1− α)N ; t) + Ch(Y˜ h,W ; ...;αN ; t) (5)
H = Hv(Y˜ v,W ; ...; (1− α)N ; t) + Hh(Y˜ h,W ; ...;αN ; t) (6)
where real net disposable income Y˜ in each sector is determined by the population
proportions and by the diﬀerence between revenues and costs,
Y˜ v = (1− α)
[
Y¯ +B + iD
D∗
p
− π
(
M +D∗
p
)]
− T (7a)
Y˜ h = α
[
Y¯ +B + iD
D∗
p
− π
(
M +D∗
p
)]
(7b)
where real disposable wealth is given by,
W = K +
D
p
= K +
M +D∗
p
(8)
and potential pre-tax income is,
Y˜ = rKK + wH (9)
where K is the real value of the capital stock, rK is the return on the capital stock
and w is the wage rate. Note that homotheticity is assumed throughout, that is,
the visible and hidden economies are scale values of one another. This implies that
Y i, Bi,M i, Di, H i, N i and W i for i = v, h are purely functions of the population pro-
portions in the hidden and visible economies with the exception of the tax burden T
that only aﬀects the visible economy.
2.3 Measuring Seignorage.
In this sub-section the seignorage equation (15) and the marginal rate of substitution
between direct taxes and inﬂation (17) under the optimal policy trajectory are speciﬁed.
Firstly, the tax burden is invariant to changes in the tax-mix, this is ensured by the
“forcing function” (10) which causes taxes T to change in response to changes in
inﬂation π such that the tax burden θ remains constant over time,
θ(t) = T +
πM
p
(iD − π)
p
(10)
where θ the “wondrous dynamic parameter”3 is a function only of time t. Secondly, the
level of wealth is also invariant to changes in the tax-mix. This ensures that the real
level of wealth is a function only of time and is not aﬀected by the level of inﬂation,
∆(t) =
D
p
=
M +D∗
p
(11)
3Phelps (1973), page 73.
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Thirdly, to avoid a wealth eﬀect at time t = 0 from an increase in inﬂation, we require
the price level to remain constant at this time,
p(0) = p0 > 0 (12)
of course, the rate of inﬂation may change at time t = 0 following a change in policy
but the price level should not.
Substituting equations (3), (11) and (12) into (10) and re-arranging gives seignorage
tax at time zero,4
iD
M
p0
= θ(0)− T + (iD − π)∆(0) (13)
where increased inﬂation generates increased seignorage and reduces the tax burden.
There may be an additional increase in seignorage revenue insofar as the real rate of
interest (iD − π) may fall.
To further simplify the analysis, the arbitrage condition that the real rate of return
on the debt (D) equals the real rate of return on capital (K) and is a constant (ς) is
imposed,
(iD − π) = rK = ς (14)
Substituting in (14) for the arbitrage condition into (13) deﬁnes,
(ς + π)
M
p0
= θ(0)− T + ς∆(0) (15)
Equation (15) speciﬁes how much the private sector pays to hold a particular level of
liquidity. A behavioural equation describing money demand by the private sector is
required, thus liquidity preference is speciﬁed by,
M
p0
= L(Y, rK + π,K +D/p0) (16)
Thus, diﬀerentiating equation (13) with respect to inﬂation gives equation (17), where
the implicit tax rate on liquidity is i = ς + π, i.e. the foregone real return on capital
plus the inﬂation tax revenue.
−dT
dπ
=
d
dπ
(
iM
p0
)
=
M
p0
+ iLr+π + iLY
dY
dπ
(17)
Equation (17) describes the marginal change in tax to changes in inﬂation.
4Start by substituting (3) into the second term on the right hand side of equation (10) to give, θ(t) =
T + π(D−D
∗)
p − (iD−π)D
∗
p . Then, cancel matching items in the second and third terms, θ(t) = T +
πD
p − iDD
∗
p . Substituting equation (11) into the second and third terms on the right hand side gives,
θ(t) = T + π∆(t) − iD
(
∆(t)− Mp
)
. Collect terms with ∆(t), θ(t) = T + (π − iD)∆(t) + iDMp .
Substitute in using (12) for values at time zero, θ(0) = T + (π − iD)∆(0) + iDMp0 . Re-arranging with
seignorage tax iDMp on the left hand side gives equation (13).
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2.4 Addressing Friedman’s Propositions.
Phelps (1973) addresses two propositions by Friedman (1971). The ﬁrst proposition
is that seignorage revenue may actually fall following an increase in inﬂation. Phelps
shows how his own model is consistent with this result subject to particular values for
the interest elasticity of liquidity preference. The second proposition is that there may
be no conﬂict between full liquidity and inﬂation tax revenue maximisation but Phelps
states that his own model is inconsistent with this: “If, with Friedman, we identify full
liquidity ... as occurring if and only if i ≤ 0, and if we assume, again with Friedman,
that
L(Y, 0, K +D0/p0) <∞ (18)
then the revenue from the inﬂation tax, iDM/p0 must be non-positive at full liquidity.
At any inﬂation rate too large for full liquidity, but not so large that M/p = 0, inﬂa-
tion tax revenue is positive. Hence there is a conﬂict between acquiring revenue and
achieving full liquidity.”5
3 Optimising the Revenue from Inﬂation.
The government sets policy targets to maximise the private sector’s welfare and in
doing this takes into account the private sector’s responses. To solve the model, the
preferences of the private sector and the constraints facing both the private and gov-
ernment sectors are speciﬁed.
3.1 The Private Sector’s Preferences.
The behaviour of the private sector is obviously relevant to the formulation of the
tax-mix. In this section the utility maximising behaviour of the visible and hidden
economies is obtained using Lagrangean functions. To begin an aggregate utility func-
tion is speciﬁed for each economy, liquidity is included in the utility functions as it
provides a service to private agents,
U v = U(Cv, Sv, Lv, Hv) (19a)
Uh = U(Ch, Sh, Lh, Hh) (19b)
where agents in both economies have the same preference structure over the level of
consumption (U v,hC > 0), the level of saving (U
v,h
S > 0), the level of liquidity (U
v,h
L > 0),
and manhours worked (U v,hH < 0). So private agents are the same in all aspects except
that some happen to operate in the visible economy and others in the hidden economy.
For simplicity, Phelps assumes a short-run framework such that the capital stock is
taken as pre-determined. Just two taxes are assumed, the inﬂation tax and a propor-
tional wage tax. To simplify factor pricing, capital and manhours are assumed to be
perfect substitutes with constant marginal returns. Government expenditure is ﬁxed,
liquidity is costless to produce and gross economic output is given by,
Y = w¯H + (r¯ + δ¯)K = C +G+ K˙ + δ¯K (20)
where w¯, r¯ and δ¯ are all ﬁxed in time and where w is the pre-tax wage, r is the real
rate of interest and δ is the rate of capital depreciation.
5Phelps (1973), page 76.
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3.2 The Government Budget Constraint.
The government budget constraint is calculated with inﬂation and direct taxes changing
such that the prescribed path of government debt θ(t) = ∆˙ = (D˙ − πD)/p remains
unchanged. The proportional income tax rate is τ and pre-tax earnings are Z = w¯H.
Using equation (1) and the two equalities,6
D/p = ∆ (21)
G+B + (r¯ + π)(D/p− L)− τZ − πD/p = ∆˙ (22)
gives the budget constraint facing the government,
(1− α)τZ + iL = γ + β + r¯∆− ∆˙. (23)
The left hand side of equation (23) represents all revenues to the government and the
right hand side all expenditures. Marginal tax analysis requires that the magnitude
of equation (23) remains constant and that only the tax mix of the right hand side
change as policy changes.
3.3 The Private Sector Budget Constraint.
The budget constraint for the private sector, with all expenditures on the left hand
side and all revenues on the right hand side is given by,
C + S = (1− τ)(1− α)Z + αZ + (r + δ)K + B¯ + i(∆− L)− π∆− δK. (24)
Assuming all aspects of the visible and hidden economies are a function of the popu-
lation proportions, with the exception of the income tax burden, equation (24) can be
re-arranged and split between the two sectors,
(1− α)[C + S + iL] = (1− α)[r¯W +B + (1− τ)Z] (25a)
α [C + S + iL] = α [r¯W +B + Z] (25b)
where wealth and savings are respectively given by,
W = K +∆, S = W˙ . (26)
3.4 The Private Sector’s Optimising Behaviour.
In order to derive the behaviour of the visible and hidden economies the ﬁrst order
conditions for the following two Lagrangeans must be satisﬁed.
Λv = U v(Cv, Sv, Lv, Hv)− λv(1−α)([C + S + iL]− [B + r¯W + (1− τ)Z])(27a)
Λh = Uh(Ch, Sh, Lh, Hh)− λh α ([C + S + iL]− [B + r¯W + Z]) (27b)
6At this point Phelps (1973) switches notation and uses t to denote the direct tax rate rather than
time. For the sake of continuity, here t continues to denote time and τ denotes the direct tax rate.
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Note that this optimisation, like that of Phelps, is in the context of a static analysis.
The resulting ﬁrst order conditions for the visible and hidden economies are,
U vC = U
v
S = λ
v(1− α)
U vL = λ
v(1− α)i = U vCi
U vH = −λv(1− α)(1− τ)w¯ = −U vC(1− τ)w¯
or, U vZ = −λv(1− α)(1− τ) = −U vC(1− τ)
(28a)
UhC = U
h
S = λ
hα
UhL = λ
hαi = UhCi
UhH = −λhαw¯ = −UhCw¯
or, UhZ = −λhα = −UhC
(28b)
Using these ﬁrst order conditions we can specify the maximised utility (U∗) subject
to the tax rates from direct taxes τ and the inﬂation tax rate i. Writing the value
functions for this optimisation in the visible and hidden economies,
V v(τ, i) = U v∗[C(τ, i), S(τ, i), L(τ, i), Z(τ, i)] (29a)
V h(τ, i) = Uh∗[C(τ, i), S(τ, i), L(τ, i), Z(τ, i)] (29b)
The eﬀect of the tax rates on the optimised level of utility is given by the derivatives
on equations (29a) and (29b),
V vτ (τ, i) = U
v∗
C
∂C
∂τ
+ U v∗S
∂S
∂τ
+ U v∗L
∂L
∂τ
+ U v∗Z
∂Z
∂τ
V vi (τ, i) = U
v∗
C
∂C
∂i
+ U v∗S
∂S
∂i
+ U v∗L
∂L
∂i
+ U v∗Z
∂Z
∂i
(30a)
V hτ (τ, i) = U
h∗
C
∂C
∂τ
+ Uh∗S
∂S
∂τ
+ Uh∗L
∂L
∂τ
+ Uh∗Z
∂Z
∂τ
V hi (τ, i) = U
h∗
C
∂C
∂i
+ Uh∗S
∂S
∂i
+ Uh∗L
∂L
∂i
+ Uh∗Z
∂Z
∂i
(30b)
Substituting the ﬁrst order conditions in (28a) and (28b) into (30a) and (30b) gives,
V vτ (τ, i) = U
v∗
C
[
∂C
∂τ
+ ∂S
∂τ
+ i∂L
∂τ
− (1− τ)∂Z
∂τ
]
V vi (τ, i) = U
v∗
C
[
∂C
∂i
+ ∂S
∂i
+ i∂L
∂i
− (1− τ)∂Z
∂i
] (31a)
V hτ (τ, i) = U
h∗
C
[
∂C
∂τ
+ ∂S
∂τ
+ i∂L
∂τ
− ∂Z
∂τ
]
V hi (τ, i) = U
h∗
C
[
∂C
∂i
+ ∂S
∂i
+ i∂L
∂i
− ∂Z
∂i
] (31b)
Diﬀerentiation of the budget constraint represented by equations (25a) and (25b) gives,
(1− α)Z + (1− α) [∂C
∂τ
+ ∂S
∂τ
+ i∂L
∂τ
− (1− τ)∂Z
∂τ
]
= 0
(1− α)L+ (1− α) [∂C
∂i
+ ∂S
∂i
+ i∂L
∂i
− (1− τ)∂Z
∂i
]
= 0
(32a)
α
[
∂C
∂τ
+ ∂S
∂τ
+ i∂L
∂τ
− ∂Z
∂τ
]
= 0
αL+ α
[
∂C
∂i
+ ∂S
∂i
+ i∂L
∂i
− ∂Z
∂i
]
= 0
(32b)
Substituting equations (32a) and (32b) into (31a) and (31b) generates expressions for
changes in the optimal level of utility as the policy mix changes. These equations are
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of prime interest from the government’s standpoint in determining the optimal tax-mix
policy,
V vτ (τ, i) = −U v∗C Z (33a)
V vi (τ, i) = −U v∗C L (33b)
V hτ (τ, i) = −Uh∗C 0 = 0 (33c)
V hi (τ, i) = −Uh∗C L (33d)
These equations are analogous to those numbered (33) in Phelps’s paper. Equation
(33c) is the only one that has no analogous equivalent, it suggests that at the margin,
the level of utility in the hidden economy does not diminish when the burden of direct
wage taxation increases.
3.5 The Government’s Optimising Behaviour.
A benevolent government would set tax policy to maximise utility as represented by
equations (29a) and (29b), subject to the constraint in equation (23). To establish this
optimal tax policy the following Lagrangean is speciﬁed,
Ψ(τ, i) = (1− α)V v(τ, i) + αV h(τ, i) + µ[τ(1− α)Z + iL− R¯] (34)
Notice that the government weights the utility functions of the visible and hidden
economies in accordance to their population shares. Setting R¯ = τ(1 − α)Z + iL,
the ﬁrst order derivatives for this Lagrangean are ∂Ψ
∂τ
= (1 − α)V vτ + αV hτ + µ∂R∂τ and
∂Ψ
∂i
= (1− α)V vi + αV hi + µ∂R∂i . The corresponding ﬁrst order conditions are,
(1− α)V vτ + αV hτ = −µ
∂R
∂τ
(1− α)V vi + αV hi = −µ
∂R
∂i
(35)
The government sets the tax-mix policy that maximises utility (minimises tax distor-
tions) in both the visible and hidden economies, so the derivatives of utility with respect
to inﬂation tax must be equal V vi = V
h
i . This implies through equations (33a,b,c,d)
that U v∗C = U
h∗
C = U
∗
C . This last condition, together with the conditions represented
by (33a,b,c,d) can be substituted into (35) to give,
(1− α)U∗CZ + αU∗C0 = µ
∂R
∂τ
⇒ U
∗
C
µ
=
∂R/∂τ
(1− α)Z
(1− α)U∗CL+ αU∗CL = µ
∂R
∂i
⇒ U
∗
C
µ
=
∂R/∂i
L
Equating the two expressions above gives the government policy target,
∂R/∂τ
(1− α)Z =
∂R/∂i
L
=
U∗C
µ
, (36)
this deﬁnes the tax-mix that maximises social welfare subject to a constant total tax
revenue, R¯ = τ(1−α)Z+iL. The increases in overall income (I) required to compensate
for any change in the direct tax rate τ or the inﬂation tax rate i are,(
∂I
∂τ
)
V¯ v,h
= −Z,
(
∂I
∂i
)
V¯ v,h
= −L, (37)
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The subscripts in equations (37) indicate that utility is being kept constant in the
respective sectors by compensating agents for changes in the tax-mix. Taking partial
derivatives of the government revenue function and substituting in (37) speciﬁes,
∂R
∂τ
= (1− α) [τ [(∂Z
∂τ
)
V¯ v
− Z ∂Z
∂I
]
+ i
[(
∂L
∂τ
)
V¯ v
− Z ∂L
∂I
]
+ Z
]
+ α
[
τ
[(
∂Z
∂τ
)
V¯ h
− Z ∂Z
∂I
]
+ i
[(
∂L
∂τ
)
V¯ h
− Z ∂L
∂I
]
+ Z
]
∂R
∂i
= (1− α) [τ [(∂Z
∂i
)
V¯ v
− L∂Z
∂I
]
+ i
[(
∂L
∂i
)
V¯ v
− L∂L
∂I
]
+ L
]
+ α
[
τ
[(
∂Z
∂i
)
V¯ h
− L∂Z
∂I
]
+ i
[(
∂L
∂i
)
V¯ h
− L∂L
∂I
]
+ L
]
(38)
By re-arranging, these equations can be expressed more compactly as,
∂R
∂τ
= (1− α) [τ(∂Z
∂τ
)
V¯ v
+ i
(
∂L
∂τ
)
V¯ v
]
+ α
[
τ
(
∂Z
∂τ
)
V¯ h
+ i
(
∂L
∂τ
)
V¯ h
]
+ Z
(
1− τ ∂Z
∂I
− i∂L
∂I
)
∂R
∂i
= (1− α) [τ(∂Z
∂i
)
V¯ v
+ i
(
∂L
∂i
)
V¯ v
]
+ α
[
τ
(
∂Z
∂i
)
V¯ h
+ i
(
∂L
∂i
)
V¯ h
]
+ L
(
1− τ ∂Z
∂I
− i∂L
∂I
) (39)
where the substitutions
(
∂L
∂τ
)
V¯ v
=
(
∂Z
∂i
)
V¯ v
and
(
∂L
∂τ
)
V¯ h
=
(
∂Z
∂i
)
V¯ h
have been made, these
hold thanks to Slutsky symmetry.
Substituting the behavioural equations (39) into the policy target equations (36)
yields the following rather unwieldy equation which represents a special case of equation
(3) in Ramsey (1927),
U∗C
µ
− (1− τ ∂Z
∂I
− i∂L
∂I
)
=
(1− α) [τ(∂Z
∂τ
)
V¯ v
+ i
(
∂L
∂τ
)
V¯ v
]
+ α
[
τ
(
∂Z
∂τ
)
V¯ h
+ i
(
∂L
∂τ
)
V¯ h
]
(1− α)Z
=
(1− α) [τ(∂Z
∂i
)
V¯ v
+ i
(
∂L
∂i
)
V¯ v
]
+ α
[
τ
(
∂Z
∂i
)
V¯ h
+ i
(
∂L
∂i
)
V¯ h
]
L
(40)
Assuming there are no cross substitution eﬀects in the demand for one commod-
ity (Z,L) with respect to the price of the other commodity (i, τ), then (∂L/∂τ)V =
(∂Z/∂i)V = 0 and equation (40) can be simpliﬁed to,
τ
Z
[
(1− α)
(
∂Z
∂τ
)
V¯ v
+ α
(
∂Z
∂τ
)
V¯ h
]
=
(1− α)i
L
[
(1− α)
(
∂L
∂i
)
V¯ v
+ α
(
∂L
∂i
)
V¯ h
]
(41)
Equation (41) is the policy rule for the government, it speciﬁes the optimal direct tax
and liquidity tax rates (τ, i) as functions of the compensated marginal labour, marginal
liquidity demands and the relative size of the hidden economy (∂Z/∂τ, ∂L/∂i, α).
Recall from equation (17) that the implicit tax rate on liquidity is i = ς + π where
ς is the constant real rate of interest on capital and π is inﬂation. Departing from
Phelps’s presentation, substitute this into equation (41) and re-arrange to give,
τ
ς + π
= (1− α)Z
L
[
(1− α)(∂L
∂i
)
V¯ v
+ α
(
∂L
∂i
)
V¯ h
]
[
(1− α)(∂Z
∂τ
)
V¯ v
+ α
(
∂Z
∂τ
)
V¯ h
] (42)
Equation (42) suggests that the larger the relative size of the hidden economy, the
higher the optimal ratio of inﬂation to the tax rate. Of course, this assumes that
the compensated labour and liquidity demands do not change so as to counteract the
eﬀect of α. To deﬁne the exact magnitudes of these optimal tax rates one would have
to specify a utility function for the private sector and the government’s ﬁscal policy.
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4 Implications for Government Policy.
As discussed above, equations (41) and (42) suggest some implications of the relative
size of the hidden economy on the optimal tax-mix. Equation (41) is analogous to
equation (41) in Phelps (1973), with the addition of parameters representing the pres-
ence of a hidden economy within the private sector. Equation (42) has no analogous
equation in Phelps (1973) but illustrates the relation between the size of the hidden
economy and the ratio of direct taxes to inﬂation.
4.1 The Limiting Cases, α = 0 and α = 1.
When there is no hidden economy (α = 0), equation (41) above collapses to equation
(41) in Phelps (1973). As in Phelps’s article, an implication of equation (41) is that
if the optimal level of direct taxation is positive, then so will be the level of inﬂation
taxation. When there is no visible economy (α = 1) the right hand side of equation
(41) equals zero and the optimal direct tax rate is zero (τ = 0).
4.2 The Intermediate Cases, 0 < α < 1.
Equation (41) can also be used to consider the implications on the optimal tax-mix for
intermediate cases. As the size of the hidden economy increases the right hand side
of equation (41) becomes smaller, thus requiring a smaller tax rate τ relative to the
inﬂation tax rate i to maintain the relation. These intermediate cases also imply a
positive inﬂation tax rate for any positive direct tax rate.
4.3 Some Anecdotal Evidence.
The anecdotal evidence presented in this sub-section supports the implications of equa-
tion (42), that the ratio of direct taxes to inﬂation and the size of the hidden economy
are inversely related. The data summarises average inﬂation and hidden economy size
over four years for forty-one countries. Average values over time are reported because
the theoretical model is static and we therefore want to abstract from any dynam-
ics. Average values are taken over as many countries and years as the data permits.
In Figures 1, 2 and 3, the data are presented by country groups that face similar
economic circumstances. In Figure 4 the data for all countries are presented. These
country groups include OECD member states, economies in transition and developing
economies.
In Figure 1 summary data and plots for OECD member states are reported. These
countries represent industrialised economies and for the most part they seem to have
relatively small hidden economies and relatively high tax to inﬂation ratios. The most
evident outlier is Greece with the largest “% hidden economy” and the lowest “Tax
rate to Inﬂation” ratio. The ﬁtted line is obtained by OLS with mean tax to inﬂation
ratio a function of the hidden economy share, the negative relation between these seems
clear. Two outliers oﬀ the ﬁtted line are Belgium and Switzerland. Belgium seems to
have a particularly high tax rate and low inﬂation rate. Switzerland, on the other
hand, seems to have a particularly low tax rate.
Summary data and plots for countries in economic transition are reported in Figure
2. These represent old Soviet member states and countries that were in the Soviet
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Country Hiddena Tax rateb Inﬂationc Tax rate
Inﬂation
Austria 5.9 % 35.6 % 3.5 % 10.02
Belgium 15.2 % 43.1 % 3.0 % 14.47
Canada 10.0 % 20.7 % 3.4 % 6.04
Denmark 9.4 % 38.7 % 2.1 % 18.44
France 10.4 % 40.6 % 2.8 % 14.65
Germany 10.4 % 30.1 % 3.5 % 8.66
Greece 27.2 % 23.2 % 17.5 % 1.32
Ireland 7.8 % 32.8 % 2.8 % 11.61
Italy 20.4 % 31.4 % 5.6 % 5.61
Japan 8.5 % 22.0 % 2.4 % 9.18
Netherlands 11.8 % 33.4 % 2.8 % 11.70
Norway 5.9 % 41.1 % 3.0 % 13.60
Portugal 15.6 % 34.3 % 10.1 % 3.39
Spain 16.0 % 20.6 % 5.8 % 3.57
Sweden 10.6 % 41.6 % 6.7 % 6.23
Switzerland 6.9 % 9.1 % 4.7 % 1.96
UK 7.2 % 36.1 % 5.2 % 6.98
US 13.9 % 17.9 % 3.9 % 4.60
aUnoﬃcial GDP as a proportion of total GDP (α), mean values over 1990-1993. Taken from Johnson
et al. (1999) table A1, estimated using the currency demand method.
bRatio of government revenue to GDP, mean values over 1990-1991. Both taken from IMF (1999),
country tables, lines 81 and 99 respectively.
cMean values over 1990-1991. Taken from IMF (1999), table 64 on consumer prices.
Figure 1: Tax to inﬂation ratio and hidden economy size, OECD member states.
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Belarus 41.2 % 33.8 % 1271.8 % 0.03
Bulgaria 34.5 % 36.1 % 80.6 % 0.45
Croatia 38.6 % 12.9 % 420.3 % 0.03
Czech Republic 26.3 % 33.6 % 12.5 % 2.68
Estonia 37.4 % 30.8 % 64.4 % 0.48
Hungary 32.0 % 46.8 % 23.1 % 2.02
Latvia 43.5 % 15.2 % 103.2 % 0.15
Lithuania 48.3 % 23.5 % 153.3 % 0.15
Poland 28.6 % 41.4 % 35.6 % 1.16
Romania 34.8 % 32.0 % 158.9 % 0.20
Russia 38.0 % 14.3 % 360.8 % 0.04
aUnoﬃcial GDP as a proportion of total GDP (α), mean values over 1992-1995. Taken from Lacko
(1999) table 8, estimated using the household electricity demand approach.
bRatio of government revenue to GDP, mean values over 1990-1991. Both taken from IMF (1999),
country tables, lines 81 and 99 respectively. Mean values over 1991-3 for the Czech Republic and
Lithuania, mean values over 1992-3 for Croatia and Poland, values in 1993 for Latvia and Russia.
cMean values over 1990-1991. Taken from IMF (1999), table 64 on consumer prices. Any gaps are
ﬁlled using data for consumer price indices from UN (1996), table 51.
Figure 2: Tax to inﬂation ratio and hidden economy size, Transition economies.
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Argentina 21.8 % 51.5 % 630.3 % 0.08
Brazil 37.8 % 28.6 % 1565.0 % 0.02
Chile 18.2 % 22.3 % 19.0 % 1.18
Colombia 35.1 % 12.0 % 27.3 % 0.44
Costa Rica 23.2 % 15.1 % 19.8 % 0.76
Ecuador 31.2 % 15.6 % 49.2 % 0.32
Guatemala 50.4 % 9.1 % 24.1 % 0.38
Honduras 46.7 % 17.9 % 19.2 % 0.93
Mexico 27.1 % 15.7 % 18.7 % 0.84
Panama 62.1 % 26.5 % 1.1 % 24.12
Peru 57.4 % 12.0 % 2003.3 % 0.01
Venezuela 30.8 % 19.6 % 36.1 % 0.54
aUnoﬃcial GDP as a proportion of total GDP (α), mean values over 1990-1993. Taken from Johnson
et al. (1999) table A1, estimated using the Multiple Indicators Multiple Causes method.
bRatio of government revenue to GDP, mean values over 1990-1991. Both taken from IMF (1999),
country tables, lines 81 and 99 respectively.
cMean values over 1990-1991. Taken from IMF (1999), table 64 on consumer prices.
Figure 3: Tax to inﬂation ratio and hidden economy size, Developing economies.
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Figure 4: Tax to inﬂation ratio and hidden economy size, all three groups.
sphere of inﬂuence. These countries have faced political and economic diﬃculties in
recent years, this is reﬂected in relatively large inﬂation rates and relatively large hidden
economy shares. Again, the positive relation between the tax to inﬂation ratio and the
relative size of the hidden economy seems clear. No particular outliers seem evident,
though it seems that a quadratic function would have provided a far better ﬁtted line.
Summary statistics for developing countries are reported in Figure 3. This set of
countries is limited to Latin America, estimates for the size of the hidden economy for
countries in the African and Asian continents are very limited. Evidence of a positive
correlation between the tax to inﬂation ratio and the relative size of the hidden economy
is much weaker. Panama is the obvious outlier in this group. If the ﬁtted line had
included Panama, the relation between the “Tax rate to Inﬂation” ratio and “% hidden
economy” would have appeared positive.
Figure 4 illustrates data points for countries in all three categories. The relation
between the “Tax rate to Inﬂation” ratio and the “% hidden economy” appears neg-
ative, non-linear and well deﬁned. The obvious outlier in this group is Panama, with
the highest percentage hidden economy share and the highest “Tax rate to Inﬂation”
ratio for any of the forty-one countries illustrated here. Factors that may explain why
Panama is an outlier include the ﬁxed exchange rate of one Balboa to one US $, the
large proportion of government revenues that accrue from the Panama Canal and the
large size of the hidden economy, source: CIA (1999).
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4.4 Extensions.
Equations (41) and (42) are only suggestive of the relation between direct taxes and
inﬂation taxes. To obtain more precise policy implications one would have to calibrate
the model, specify preference functions and run simulations.
There are also important model extensions to be considered. Some of these include
heterogeneity, dollarisation, feed-back, endogeneity, dynamics and corruption. The
hidden and visible economies may be quite Heterogeneus in their access to ﬁnancial
instruments, hidden transactions are more likely to require cash and agents in the hid-
den economy may have less access to inﬂation-proofed ﬁnancial instruments. This may
imply that the inﬂation tax may be a good instrument for taxing the hidden economy
without having too much impact on the visible economy. Dollarisation describes the
process by which a foreign currency (most often the US $) may be used in preference
to the domestic currency. This generally occurs when conﬁdence in the domestic cur-
rency falls. Increasing the inﬂation tax in these circumstances may be self-defeating
because it further diminishes conﬁdence in the domestic currency and because the hid-
den transactions carried out in the foreign currency are not subject to the inﬂation
tax. Dollarisation is a good example of why Feed-Back mechanisms are important and
why the relative size of the hidden economy may be endogenous. Feed-Back mecha-
nisms also highlight the importance of the dynamic implications of policy. If Fiscal
and Monetary policies are used in some degree in response to economic cycles dynamic
aspects are particularly important when undertaking any statistical analysis. Finally,
one must consider the issue of corruption within the government sector. Throughout
the analysis we have assumed that the government is benevolent and competent, if the
government fails on either it may no longer be a welfare optimiser. Inadequate govern-
ments may mean that ﬁrst-best policies are time-inconsistent, government institutions
so inadequate as to be considered corrupt and wasteful may induce a larger proportion
of the private sector into the hidden economy.
5 Conclusion.
Equations (41) and (42) suggest that the optimal tax-mix of inﬂation and direct taxes
changes with the relative size of the hidden economy. The tax-mix is optimal in the
sense that it minimises tax distortions subject to a particular government expenditure
policy. Subject to marginal preferences over labour supply and liquidity preference
not changing radically at the margin, a larger hidden economy implies a tax-mix with
higher inﬂation relative to the direct tax rate. Anecdotal empirical evidence from
disparate groups of countries suggests that a positive correlation between the relative
size of the hidden economy and the level of price inﬂation is observed in practice.
Of course, price inﬂation is determined by a wider set of parameters than just the
relative size of the hidden economy. Though the relative size of the hidden economy
may only be of marginal importance, it is true that most macroeconomic analysis
ignores it completely. If, as Enste and Schneider (1998, 1999) suggest, the global trend
is for an increase in the relative size of the hidden economy, then inclusion of these
aspects into macroeconomic analysis is becoming increasingly important.
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